On 30 June, the two-day UN conference on Afghanistan, the so-called “Doha-3”, will commence in the capital of Qatar.
This is the third meeting of Special Envoys on Afghanistan convened in Doha by Secretary-General Guterres. The first took place on 1 May 2023, and the second on 18-19 February 2024. Both meetings occurred without the participation of the Taliban: they were not invited to the first meeting, and they declined to attend the second.
This time, an official invitation to the Taliban’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was extended by the UN Deputy Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, during her recent visit to Kabul. The Taliban did not take long to respond – on 16 June, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid announced that the Emirate had positively considered the invitation. According to him, this decision was made after careful review of the agenda for the upcoming event.
However, as diplomatic sources indicate, the UN has not yet finalised the agenda.
It is clear that the issue is not with the list of topics. The Taliban will attend the meeting with the minimum objective of using this platform to voice their well-known position. It would be naive to expect the “de facto authorities” to present anything groundbreaking – no significant changes in Taliban behaviour are anticipated.
It is now evident that the Taliban skilfully exploit international divisions to their advantage, particularly the growing geopolitical tensions in the world. This is evident in their conduct. The Taliban have realised (either independently or on advice) that none of the existing negotiation platforms on Afghanistan can influence the situation’s development around the country. Consequently, they have initiated a game regarding their legal status.
Attention should be paid to recent statements by Emir Akhundzada, reported by a Pakistani publication. In his recent speech, Akhundzada promised not to succumb to external pressure: “Who are you to interfere in our country, system, and politics? I am not here to follow your orders, and I will not take any steps with you or deal with you concerning Sharia”.
The latest example of this game is the Taliban’s non-participation in the “Regional Quartet” meeting on 8 June in Tehran. This and similar diplomatic manoeuvres by the Taliban can be interpreted as: “Continue playing your games and pursuing your interests; we will watch as you clash among yourselves”.
This “diplomacy” is also clearly demonstrated in the Taliban’s favourite theme – the regional format of interaction. Central Asian countries declare their interest in a stable and prosperous Afghanistan but continue to build relations with the Taliban unilaterally, disregarding the consolidated interests of the entire region. The “fierce mullahs” take advantage of this. Islamabad and Tehran are just beginning to dialogue on Afghanistan, and it is still too early to speak of practical joint approaches.
For the Taliban, “Doha-3” will be their first truly international platform, where they will seek to highlight the growing division among countries on how best to engage with them. Meanwhile, the organiser of the meeting has yet to determine what to discuss over two days, aside from women’s rights and an inclusive government. The preparatory work has clearly not yielded results. It’s reminiscent of the fable: “Once a swan, a crab, and a pike…”
Based on this, the Taliban are setting preliminary, deliberately unattainable conditions for their participation in the meeting. What are they counting on? The question is rhetorical.
In this deadlock, a more pertinent question arises: what should the parties do when their expectations of each other are clearly exaggerated? Perhaps it is necessary to stop telling each other fairy tales, to look at the root of the issues, and to simplify their demands. It is important to avoid global objectives – instead, they should focus on urgent tasks that are realistically achievable and relevant to the Afghan people, Afghanistan’s neighbours, and the international community. This primarily includes the humanitarian agenda, socio-economic issues, and the paramount security case. The politicisation of the “Afghan settlement” will undoubtedly lead to only one outcome – the exacerbation of the problem.
Unfortunately, the current situation is such that the Taliban and their opponents (especially those advocating for military confrontation with the Taliban) are in a form of conflict where the satisfaction of interests can only occur at the expense of and to the detriment of the other side’s interests.
Thus, the third meeting in Doha will be both complex and predictable. The latter should be viewed in the context of the Taliban’s “life-tested” tactic – “push until they are pushed back.” It is to be hoped that its outcomes will finally serve as a catalyst for a more pragmatic approach to the problem.
