Goals and motifs of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan

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Goals and motifs of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan

Kazakhstan’s approach to Afghanistan is currently largely based on economic relations. However, its political aspects are becoming increasingly apparent. The Republic of Kazakhstan does not wield much influence among ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, and unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it does not have as many opportunities for gathering information from within or conducting other operational activities. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has many opportunities and advantages on the international stage. Afghanistan heavily depends on Kazakhstan in the food industry, while the Taliban have virtually no leverage over Kazakhstan.

Omid Rahimi, Research Fellow at the Institute of Eastern Strategic Studies

 

Introduction

Central Asian countries played a secondary role in the situation surrounding Afghanistan during the presence of the United States there, but after their departure, they have become more actively positioning themselves as independent players in the Afghan track.

This process is natural for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, whose vital interests are tied to Afghanistan and as such they play a significant role in the situation surrounding this country. However, Kazakhstan’s intensification of its foreign policy efforts towards Afghanistan is now evident, despite the absence of common borders and, consequently, low conflict potential. Astana’s steps differ from the actions of the other three republics in their nature, goals, and motives, and in this context, they may lead to a different model of behavior by the Taliban.

This article attempts to examine the current relations between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, as well as the key motives and goals of this interaction.

 

Behavioural Approach

Kazakhstan, like Uzbekistan, was one of the first countries to initiate interaction with the Taliban, establishing a semi-official level of relations without acknowledging the legitimacy of the said group. During periods of instability, Astana maintained its diplomatic representation in Kabul and even appointed a new ambassador (1), indicating a change in the country’s approach after the Taliban’s consolidation of power.

Shortly after the Taliban came to power (2), the Afghan embassy in Astana was transferred to the Taliban Movement in order to preserve and maintain channels of diplomatic communication.

Over the past year, a high level of contacts has been established between the two sides, primarily focused on the economic sphere. One indicator of this approach is the increase in bilateral trade volume in the second year after the Taliban’s rise to power. In 2022, compared to 2021 (the first months of the Taliban’s rule), the volume of bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan reached $987 million, almost a 100% increase. This is despite the fact that in previous years, under the government of A. Ghani, trade between the two countries rarely exceeded $600 million.

A significant portion of the trade exchange in 2022 consisted of Kazakhstan’s imports to Afghanistan, primarily flour. Afghanistan is the largest purchaser of this product from Kazakhstan, consuming 1.3 million tons, which accounts for approximately 70% of the entire flour export of the Central Asian republic. However, in 2023, trade deals experienced a significant decline again, dropping to approximately $600 million. An important part of this trend is associated with the ban on opium poppy cultivation and the conversion of planting areas to wheat cultivation in Afghanistan, which affected the import of Kazakhstani flour.

In April 2023, the two countries held a major business forum in Kabul, following which the Kazakhstan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Kabul (3) was opened. In August 2023, a second such event took place, during which a political and economic delegation from the Taliban government, led by Minister of Industry and Trade Nuruddin Azizi and heads of the Central Bank of Afghanistan, National Energy Company, Telecommunications Company, Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock Production, as well as representatives of major private banks and other companies, visited Astana.

The reception of this trade delegation at the level of the Deputy Prime Minister demonstrates that Kazakhstan has adopted a consistent strategy regarding Afghanistan. The main directions of this joint economic initiative have become logistics, mining industry, and the banking sector, resulting in representatives of both countries signing a series of commercial documents and memorandums.

However, these relations are overshadowed by political issues, especially security concerns. During the visit of the Taliban delegation to Astana, numerous critical remarks were made regarding the presence of individuals associated with a terrorist group in this country.

The main argument of the Kazakhstani government regarding the establishment of official cooperation with the Taliban movement was the fact that this group is not recognized as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, and only certain leaders and active members are included in the Security Council’s sanctions list. It was emphasized that none of these sanctioned individuals were part of the Afghan trade delegation, and “Kazakhstan faces no threat.” However, the contradiction of this position was pointed out by the inclusion of the name “Taliban” in the list of banned groups in this country.

In late December 2023, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Aibek Smadiyarov, stated in an interview with the Kazakhstani state news agency that the aforementioned structure is not recognized as a terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council and, following recent events, Kazakhstan has removed the “Taliban Movement” from the list of prohibited terrorist groups. Explaining this decision, the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that this step could help Afghanistan emerge from international isolation.

 

Motives and Goals

The motives and goals of Kazakhstan in developing interaction with Afghanistan clearly differ from other countries in Central Asia. The key difference is due to the variance in geographical position and the absence of geopolitical continuity between these two countries. Based on this, the most important driving forces and goals of this country can be summarized as follows:

With the onset of the war in Ukraine and the sanctions regime against Russia, one of the strategic approaches of the Central Asian countries in the field of foreign policy has shifted towards looking southward and diversifying external policies. Therefore, the development of relations with Afghanistan is seen as part of the foreign policy of these countries. This approach is relevant in political, economic, and geopolitical spheres.

Many analysts believe that Kazakhstan’s approach to Afghanistan depends on the country’s market and economic prospects, with less emphasis on political factors and security issues. Almost all Kazakhstani analysts in their expert opinions over the past year have emphasized that Afghanistan is not considered a serious threat to Kazakhstan.

However, it is not appropriate to view Kazakhstan’s relations with Afghanistan solely through an economic lens, as Kazakhstan’s perspective on the situation in Afghanistan also focuses on political opportunities beyond the economic sphere. Among the two options of severing relations and ignoring or developing informal relations, Kazakhstan has chosen the latter option with a pragmatic approach.

The absence of a direct security threat (lack of a common border and large diasporas or Afghan immigrants) is an important aspect for Kazakhstan and an advantage for interactions with Afghanistan compared to countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The actual lack of dependency on security factors provides behavioral flexibility in dealing with the Taliban, and this relative advantage can be effective, especially within the framework of mediation plans by the West, Russia, and China.

At the same time, Uzbekistan’s conservatism has prevented it from playing a similar role due to national security considerations. Therefore, there is a likelihood that in the near future, we will see an increase in Kazakhstan’s role compared to Uzbekistan at the international level.

In recent years, Central Asia has become an independent region. The most important characteristic of the countries in this region is regional poles and the dynamic competition between them. In this regard, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are two regional poles, and alongside a high level of cooperation, competitive dynamics are observed, especially in regional trends. This issue is a motive and goal for Kazakhstan in addressing the Afghan issue.

This regional-level competition has manifested itself in interactions with the Taliban and, essentially, in the opportunities for this country to control and restrain their behavior through strategic levers.

Uzbekistan’s dependence on Afghanistan in terms of security, especially in the sphere of water resources due to the construction of the “Koshtepa Canal,” prevents the country from active interaction, and Kazakhstan seeks to fill this vacuum. Moreover, at the international level, especially under the government of K. Tokayev (compared to the image-based approaches of N. Nazarbayev), Kazakhstan needs Afghanistan.

This country has emphasized the importance of food security in Afghanistan more than any other country in the world. Kazakhstan is striving to establish itself as an active country in the humanitarian sphere by providing the main share of food supplies to Afghanistan. Providing over 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid and more than a million tons of food complicates competition with Kazakhstan in this area.

Like Uzbekistan, part of Kazakhstan’s strategic vision regarding Afghanistan pertains to transit and geo-economics as a whole. Kazakhstan supports the “Trans-Afghan Corridor” and views Afghanistan as a potential access point to southern waters. Evidence of this is the participation of Kazakhstani companies in the construction and reconstruction of Afghanistan’s railway infrastructure, as well as a major contract for the sale of locomotives.

However, it remains unclear whether this joint approach of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and even Turkmenistan can overcome the security situation and risks in Afghanistan. In the context of this issue, it should be noted that Kazakhstan is considered a possible participant in financing this project.

 

Outlook

Currently, Kazakhstan primarily pursues economic goals in Afghanistan, but political aspects are also becoming increasingly noticeable. Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan does not have significant influence over Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities and is limited in its ability to gather information and take other operational measures. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has numerous opportunities and advantages at the international level, alongside Afghanistan’s strong dependence on Kazakhstan in the food industry and the lack of leverage the Taliban have over Kazakhstan. If these levers and positions of Astana are strengthened, Kazakhstan will have many components for controlling the behavior of the Taliban.

Focusing on the economic sphere and developing commercial relationships at the present time is a strategic use of levers. At the international level, especially within multilateral political platforms involving major powers, Kazakhstan has more experience and political opportunities than Uzbekistan. Therefore, likely aiming at this advantage, it will attempt to shift the decision-making center for Afghanistan from Tashkent and Samarkand to Astana and Almaty. Naturally, such a process would come at a high cost to Uzbekistan and may call into question many of the political achievements of this country in recent years. Therefore, at a certain level, Kazakhstan’s strategy may lead to a change in Uzbekistan’s behavior. Tashkent’s adoption of a more stringent policy towards the Taliban could be one indication of such a change in behavior.

(1) In fact, Ambassador A. Esengeldiyev was appointed to the position in 2018.

(2) In 2023, the building of the Iranian Embassy was provided to accredited Taliban diplomats, with the mission being led by chargés d’affaires ad interim.

(3) The Trade House of the Republic of Kazakhstan opened in the city of Herat in western Afghanistan.