Regarding the ethnic dimension of Afghanistan

Recent Afghan history has elevated the “national question” from mundane to having a defining significance for political and social stability in this country, and the discourse around it has taken on a vivid political hue, with the theme of interethnic relations continuing to serve as a source of agitation both around and within Afghanistan.

Against the backdrop of international community demands to ensure inclusive governance, attempts to actualize the idea of federalism have been noted in the public discourse, which, in the view of its few supporters, is almost the only way to ensure long-term peace.

The issue of federalism in Afghanistan is not new and has long been discussed, mostly linked to recent historical events, primarily the civil war that began in 1978 with the “April Revolution”.

Are there historical precedents? The proponents of this concept overly rely on the historical region of Khorasan (encompassing various parts of modern Afghanistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) and the broader Aryan region (extending to modern-day Pakistan). In our opinion, such a paradigm requires a more scholarly approach and evaluation.

In essence, the emergence of modern borders of Afghanistan, especially in the north with the Central Asian republics and the Durand Line (border with Pakistan), is not linked to natural processes (population settlement, ethno-linguistic identity, geographical factors, historical regions, etc.). These boundaries were formed as a result of the rivalry between two empires – the British and the Russian. Meanwhile, the first Afghan state – the Durrani Empire (18th–19th centuries) – exerted its authority over more extensive territories.

This condition can be considered “historically established”, as well as the fact that modern Afghanistan is the successor of the Ahmad Shah Durrani state. Since then, the central authority (in Kabul and Kandahar) has been maintaining its power with a focus on the diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious composition, but always with an emphasis on Pashtun-centricism. However, separatism has never been characteristic of the northern peoples of Afghanistan.

So far, no modern regime in Afghanistan has succeeded in advancing the idea of “Afghan nationalism”, reflecting the national unity of the country’s people. Populist (yet, of course, very important) slogans about a “united nation” have always emanated from the capital but did not reflect the realities. In the latest republican constitution (2004), it is stated (Article 4) that the Afghan nation consists of “Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Baloch, Pashais, Nuristanis, Aimaqs, Arabs, Kyrgyz, Kyzylbash, Gujjars, Brahuis, and other tribes”, and the term “Afghan” applies to every citizen of Afghanistan.

Multinational Afghanistan has shown the resilience of its ethnic groups, but it has not yet been able to demonstrate their synthesis into a society with strong self-identification as the Afghan nation, and the term “Afghan” continues to serve as an exonym, a generalizing name for the residents of Afghanistan.

The main question is how the Taliban will move in this direction under new circumstances, maintaining Pashtun-centric status quo and the traditions of Durrani statehood.

Even the communists were characterized by ethnic discord – the “People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan” (PDPA) initially split into warring factions: Pashtuns united in the “Khalq” faction (translated as “People”), while the other bloc – “Parcham” (“Banner”) – consisted mainly of Tajiks.

After the overthrow of Najibullah’s regime, former allies began a war against each other. The attempt to create a coalition government (inclusive in the modern sense) only led to unprecedented chaos. The Pashtun “Islamic Party of Afghanistan” (“Hezb-e Islami”, Hekmatyar) fought against the Tajik-Uzbek alliance: the “Islamic Society of Afghanistan” (“Jami’at-e Islami”, Massoud, Ismail Khan) and the “National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan” (NIMA, Dostum). Then, Dostum made a truce with Hekmatyar and started a war against Massoud, who was also opposed by the Hazaras. These are just the main points of the civil war. Overall, the situation at that time can be characterized as bellum omnium contra omnes (the war of all against all).

While the mujahideen fought for power, a new player emerged – the Taliban, who founded their first Islamic emirate as early as 1996. Non-Pashtuns once again united, reviving the so-called “Northern Alliance” (“United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan”), where the main role was played by the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud.

And only the American “Enduring Freedom” allowed former mujahideen to return to life. But for the Afghans themselves, the war against the “students” was just a stage of civil confrontation.

The cabinets of ministers in the transitional and republican periods looked quite ethnically diverse – Pashtun representation averaged 50–60%, representatives of minority nationalities periodically replaced each other in the positions of vice presidents, presidents were Pashtuns (Karzai, Ghani), and the parliament was inclusive. The question in the “center” seemed to have been resolved, but the situation in the provinces remained unchanged.

Despite all this, the Taliban always remained present at the level of their shadow government, de facto controlling entire regions.

One of our Afghan colleagues-experts (Pashtun), characterizing the communist and republican periods in terms of the “national question”, pointed out that this era only intensified interethnic contradictions, and political choices always opened new seasons of struggle for dominance in the ethnically diverse country, gradually disrupting the historical balance between “Pashtuns-non-Pashtuns”, which led to modern realities, in which (as an example of daily life) Pashtuns do not speak Dari, and non-Pashtun minorities do not speak Pashto (don’t want to). In his words, non-Pashtuns truly gained power only with the arrival of the Soviet Union and subsequently established themselves as a political and military force.

Separately, we would like to touch upon the position of the Hazara community in recent Afghan history, which has made its mark on the ethno-political situation in this country and is rightfully considered the most oppressed Afghan ethnic group. For centuries, Hazaras, with their Turkic-Mongolian-Iranian roots and Shiism, have been subjected to tyranny by Pashtuns and other ethnic groups.

The beginning of relatively independent political activity of Hazaras dates back to the 1990s, after the collapse of the communist regime. In addition to dominating certain parts of the capital, they became fully autonomous in Hazarajat and skillfully maneuvered between different forces.

However, their situation qualitatively improved only with the arrival of the Western coalition. A whole layer of Hazara politicians and statesmen emerged. Like never before, Hazaras began to prosper in business.

Afghan territories encompassing the historical region of Hazarajat – about 12% of the country’s territory – are rich in valuable resources, apart from significant hydroelectric potential. These resources include the largest iron deposit, “Hajigak”, as well as deposits of tungsten, tin, zinc, lead, lithium salts, and others. In Bamyan province, the first national park, Band-e Amir, with the country’s only ski resort, is located, along with the world-famous statues of Buddha destroyed by the Taliban. Additionally, Hazara lands are renowned for their agricultural lands, with the Bamyan potato being well-known.

Returning to power in 2021, the Taliban halted the bloody civil war that began in the distant 1978. However, they faced a complex set of problems, the cornerstone of which is the “national question”, especially significant beyond Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the reality is that the Taliban will never, under any circumstances, pursue regional autonomy – this fundamentally contradicts the ideals of the “Afghan state”, and the Afghan people’s memories of decades of civil war are still fresh.

We are convinced that Afghanistan, in its current state, is not ready for a federal system; a deep historical analysis is not required for this. The people of this country are much more concerned with overcoming the humanitarian crisis and achieving economic and social recovery than with the ambitions of a small group of politicians.

Our region (and indeed the entire world) needs a stable Afghanistan in every sense, not its “Balkanization”. In turn, the “de facto authorities” have focused on social policy – addressing the needs and aspirations of the common people, attempting to realize the country’s geo-economic potential, and fairly successfully engaging in regional trade and economic cooperation. The calculation is simple – the Emirate government ensures economic stability and fights poverty, increasing the trust of all ethnic groups. This is a kind of “internal jihad” – a struggle against poverty, destruction, and social injustice, unlike the previous factors of national consolidation against foreign threats.

In the realm of domestic politics, the strategy of the Taliban (Pashtun) will primarily be based on consolidating all ethnic groups around them, with Islam as the main tool, supported by assimilation and expansion measures, as practiced by all Pashtun rulers.