Decriminalising the Taliban in Russia: Path to Recognition or Necessary Measure?

“Kazakhstan has removed the Taliban regime from its terrorist list, considering the importance of developing trade and economic cooperation with modern Afghanistan and understanding that this regime is a long-term factor,” stated K. Tokayev*.

Russia continues to actively build its relations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, yet still maintains the Taliban on its list of terrorist organisations. However, progress is being made: on May 27, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice reported to President Vladimir Putin that the Taliban could be removed from the list of banned organisations in the country.

The Russian position was most clearly articulated by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who stated that the proposal to exclude the Taliban from the list of banned organisations “reflects an acknowledgment of reality.” According to him, “they (the Taliban) are the real power. Afghanistan matters to us, to our allies, especially in Central Asia.”

This news has, of course, been positively received in Afghanistan. According to Zabihullah Mujahid, the official representative of the IEA, expanding cooperation with Russia aims to remove obstacles to improving relations between the countries.

The reaction from the West was quite predictable. The core of the European debate revolves around the potential consequences of such a rapprochement with the Taliban, up to and including recognition of its government. The US went further – National Security Advisor John Kirby called Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorist organisations a “horrible message.” According to him, this step could serve as a negative example for other countries.

For the sake of objectivity, it is worth noting that in the United States, the Taliban is not a banned movement – it is not on the State Department’s list of terrorist organisations, although its Pakistani counterparts, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are listed, which is quite understandable – Pakistan is designated by the US as a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” the only one in the South Asian region. In this context, Washington’s position appears at least biased.

The Taliban movement has never been classified as a terrorist organisation within the United Nations system, which has also never imposed sanctions on the Taliban itself. There are only personal sanctions against individual Taliban members, introduced by UN Security Council Resolution 2255 (2015) on 21 December 2015.

Regardless of the reaction that may follow, given Moscow’s level of involvement in the “Afghan issue,” one thing is objectively clear: the presence of the Taliban on Russia’s prohibited list appears at least illogical.

However, it is not yet certain that the decriminalisation of the Taliban in Russia will take place. Moscow still has time to make a final decision. This will depend on various factors.

Meanwhile, Russia maintains a number of demands on the Emirate for the full recognition of its government, including the implementation of internal reforms. At the same time, regarding the human rights situation, which is highly emphasised by the West and which irritates the Taliban, Moscow adheres to the principle of non-interference, stating that “we are dealing with sovereign authorities.” This was particularly noted by Zamir Kabulov, who stated that ensuring the rights of women and girls is not a condition but a wish. In this regard, Moscow is a convenient partner for Kabul.

Overall, if an “amnesty” does occur, it will only have symbolic significance for now. The actual development of bilateral Russian-Afghan relations, especially economic ones, is unlikely to be significantly facilitated by the exclusion. However, removing the Taliban from the list of terrorists will enhance the interaction between the business communities of the two countries. Previously, any business contacts could have been viewed as cooperation with a terrorist organisation.

Indeed, Moscow shows interest in a number of ambitious projects in Afghanistan, such as the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline or the Trans-Afghan railway. But all of these projects are far from being realised, partly due to security issues within Afghanistan. Similarly, mining and energy sector projects have not progressed beyond statements. Only China has committed to relatively significant investments for the Afghan authorities – last year, Chinese company Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co signed a 25-year contract for oil extraction in northern Afghanistan, with total investments expected to reach $540 million by 2026.

Another block of assessments and opinions concerns geopolitical factors, based on the thesis that partnership with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is important for the Kremlin – it is an opportunity for Russian authorities to demonstrate that they are not alone in the anti-Western camp.

Afghan expert Nasrullah Stanikzai notes that Russia has likely taken these steps for several reasons.

Firstly, the strained relations between Moscow and the West have compelled Russian authorities to seek partnerships with forces opposing the US.

Secondly, there is significant concern among Russian authorities regarding the terrorist threat from Afghanistan, especially from groups like ISIS.

Renowned political scientist Arkady Dubnov evaluates the statements of the Russian authorities in a similar vein. In his opinion, “Afghanistan occupies a position in Russian policy as a tool in relations with the US, and it has long been time to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list — this decision is overdue.”

In Kabul and Kandahar, this situation is understood, as is the role of the US and the West in the unfolding ‘New Great Game.’ Meanwhile, the US remains Afghanistan’s leading humanitarian donor. In this context, the Taliban is unlikely to enter into a ‘grand bargain’ with Russia. Unlike ‘Taliban 1.0,’ the ‘second coming’ Taliban do not wish to be antagonists or anti-heroes to anyone, at least until they decide whose side they are more comfortable on or until they extract maximum benefits from the parties involved. This is when ‘Taliban 3.0’ will emerge.

Although the spheres of potential bilateral cooperation are still limited and unclear, and the Taliban are playing a multilateral game, Moscow sees important prospects in the de facto Afghan authorities, primarily through the lens of building its policy in the Central Asian direction and relations with Beijing.

An important aspect is access to new trade routes, which will help mitigate the impact of Western sanctions, as well as bolster Moscow’s reputation as an ally in the Global South.

For the Central Asian countries, Russia’s Afghan vector will, if not serve as a guide, at least play a positive role in the long-term planning of economic integration, which in turn will contribute to regional stability. Integrating Afghanistan into the local economic architecture can undoubtedly enhance regional influence, appease diplomatic opponents among the Taliban, and make the de facto authorities more predictable.

* In December 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan announced the removal of the Taliban movement from the list of banned organisations in the country.