The Role of Central Asia in the Economic Policy of the Taliban Government
We continue to acquaint readers with foreign materials on the topic of ‘Central Asia – Afghanistan,’ which, in our opinion, deserve expert attention.
This time, we introduce the perspective of the Iranian Institute for East Strategic Studies on the issues of the Central Asian vector in the foreign policy of the de facto authorities of Afghanistan.
The author presents the choice between South Asia and Central Asia as a dilemma for Afghanistan. The reason for this choice is to reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan. In conclusion, the author emphasizes the need for a regional approach, taking into account the interests of regional countries while adhering to the principle of impartiality and avoiding conflicts with neighbors, which will allow achieving maximum benefits from an economically oriented foreign policy.
We fully agree with the author’s conclusions but question why such a paradigm is being built based on the opposition of two different regions. Questions such as whether Central Asia has the potential to become an alternative to Pakistan, in our view, are inappropriate, especially considering the principle of value neutrality. The author’s theses are largely based on evaluative judgments and do not reflect the spirit of building harmonious relations in the region, which is in great need of peace, stability, and robust economic cooperation.
In our view, two Asian regions (Central and South) cannot be considered as possible alternatives for Afghanistan, even within the framework of the conclusion on the need for a regional approach.
We are convinced that the Central Asian countries have no need to compete with Pakistan. On the contrary, our region is extremely interested in expanding economic ties with the South Asian zone, and Afghanistan can help us in this – hence the concept of a ‘bridge between Central Asia and South Asia.’
The article objectively and rationally assesses the essence of Afghan-Pakistani relations in the context of the Durand Line and security aspects. The expert does not focus on the latter (security is not the main theme of the material), but a broader understanding of this sphere will provide insight into the depth of existing contradictions. The Durand Line and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are just surface-level problems, while the roots lie in historical preconditions. In addition, local experts are reluctant to talk about another ‘territorial issue’ – Baluchistan, another headache for Islamabad and Tehran. Later, we plan to dedicate a series of articles to this block of questions. We have also featured assessments from one of the experts in our Telegram channel.
In this context, we agree with the author’s point of view that Pakistan always adheres to a policy of weakening and dependence on Afghanistan.”
Afghanistan’s New Approach in Regional Politics.
The Role of Central Asia in the Economic Policy of the Taliban Government
Author: Mirahmad Mashal, Master of International Relations
The emphasis on security, relevant during Hamid Karzai’s era, was officially replaced by an economically oriented foreign policy under Ashraf Ghani. One of the key elements of this approach was the reduction of economic interaction with South Asia, especially with Pakistan, which was considered a crisis-prone region. Simultaneously, there was an increase in economic ties with Central Asia, seen as a more stable and partially less dangerous region. The aim of this approach was to decrease Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan in security matters.
Introduction
Despite previous support from Pakistan, the Taliban, upon coming to power, shifted their foreign policy focus towards an economically oriented approach, distancing themselves from Pakistan and approaching Central Asia.
Afghanistan holds a unique geographic position, bordered by the arid region of Central Asia to the north, South Asia (including neighboring Pakistan) to the south, China to the east (Xinjiang’s mountainous region), and Iran to the west. Despite mutual interdependence in political, security, economic, and even social spheres with its surrounding regions, Afghanistan maintained close ties with the South Asian region for several decades. This was due to Afghanistan being drawn into complex processes in the turbulent South Asia and strengthening economic connections with this region. In other words, Afghanistan, by adopting a security-oriented approach, found itself entangled in crises in the region, leading to unfavorable conditions, primarily a challenging economic situation.
Hamid Karzai’s security-focused orientation was replaced by a foreign policy based on economic relations under Ashraf Ghani. Key characteristics of this approach included reducing economic interactions with South Asia, especially crisis-prone Pakistan, and increasing economic ties with Central Asia—a region perceived as calmer, albeit somewhat unstable. The primary objective of this policy was to lessen Afghanistan’s economic dependence on Pakistan, directly impacting Afghanistan’s security. This fact remains relevant.
After the fall of the republican regime and the Taliban’s rise to power, a new economic paradigm in Afghanistan’s foreign policy becomes more evident. Despite having received support from Pakistan during their struggle against the U.S. and the republican government, the Taliban, akin to the Ashraf Ghani period, prioritize economic closeness with Central Asia in their foreign policy to distance themselves from Pakistan. This raises the question of to what extent Central Asia can serve as a suitable alternative. In other words, can Central Asia make Afghanistan less dependent on Pakistan?
Inevitability of Afghanistan’s Orientation towards South Asia in Security Matters
The question arises: why does Afghanistan need to reduce economic ties with South Asia, despite its economic advantages? The answer may be that Afghanistan is so interconnected with this region in terms of security that avoiding it is quite challenging. Afghanistan cannot avoid its ties with South Asia for two reasons.
Firstly, it is the Durand Line issue—a problem that no Afghan government has been able to solve and has been a source of disagreements and crises since the formation of Pakistan, creating mutual security problems for both countries.
The second reason is that Afghanistan is compelled to compete with Pakistan and choose a policy of alignment with India, as observed in the country’s behavior over the past few decades. Despite the Pakistani calculation that the Durand Line issue and the inclination towards India would be eliminated from the Taliban government’s agenda, recent developments indicate that the Taliban government, at least regarding the Durand Line issue, relies on approaches of previous regimes. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Taliban government will use India as a tool against Pakistan in the future. In this context, regardless of the regime in Afghanistan, the country’s interaction with South Asia is inevitable. Economic relations and Afghanistan’s need for Pakistan have always served as leverage against the Pakistani side. Therefore, Kabul is forced to contemplate this issue.
Central Asia as an Alternative to South Asia
The South Asian region provides significant economic benefits for Afghanistan. This densely populated region offers three main advantages.
Firstly, South Asia is the primary market for Afghan products, with statistics showing the highest export deliveries to Pakistan and India.
Secondly, the South Asian region serves as a stable source of essential consumer goods for Afghanistan.
Thirdly, South Asia is the shortest route to maritime ports for Afghanistan. However, security conflicts with Pakistan have brought negative consequences for Afghanistan. Therefore, Afghans are exploring alternative options to mitigate the adverse economic effects of their confrontation with Pakistan.
In this regard, during Ashraf Ghani’s tenure, Central Asia was proposed as an alternative to Pakistan and, in general, the entire South Asian region. Apparently, such a policy is also on the agenda of the current Afghan government. However, the question arises: does Central Asia have the potential to become an economic alternative to Pakistan in conditions significantly different from the past?
The Soviet Union was Afghanistan’s largest economic and political partner. However, the USSR’s dissolution, the split of Central Asia into five independent republics, and corresponding political changes in Afghanistan led to a significant reduction in Afghanistan’s relations with the Central Asian region. Now the question is whether Central Asia, under conditions vastly different from the past, can become an economic substitute for Pakistan.
In response, it can be asserted that in a relative sense – yes, but overall, Central Asia is not entirely capable of making Afghanistan independent of Pakistan. On the whole, Central Asia has economic advantages. One crucial advantage is the absence of significant security challenges between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries. The security factor has been a barrier in economic relations between Kabul and Islamabad, a hindrance that is practically nonexistent in relations with the Central Asian republics.
There is an issue of water use with two northern neighbors – Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. However, expectations of disagreements on this issue reaching the levels seen with Pakistan are not warranted.
The second point is that Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan is more driven by security concerns rather than economics. Meanwhile, the countries of Central Asia view Afghanistan as a promising economic partner. In other words, while Pakistan, pursuing a policy of deep strategic influence, seeks to use the Afghan security factor against India, the northern neighbors do not share the same approach. Therefore, Pakistan consistently adheres to a policy of weakening and keeping Afghanistan dependent, while Central Asia aims for a stable and economically attractive Afghanistan.
From an economic standpoint, this region can fulfill a significant portion of Afghanistan’s needs. The five Central Asian countries collectively have the potential to constitute a comprehensive economic package for Afghanistan’s economy. In turn, these five republics have the potential to serve as a broad market for Afghan products.
Another advantage of Central Asia over Pakistan is Afghanistan’s possession of border crossings connecting it to almost all its northern neighbors via railways. This advantage is beneficial for Afghanistan both in diversifying and developing trade relations on a larger scale.
The final advantage Central Asia has over Pakistan lies in Afghanistan’s connections with China, Russia, and Europe. This circumstance allows Afghanistan to establish relations with almost half of the world through Central Asia.
Central Asia cannot provide Afghanistan with one crucial element – access to seaports. Afghanistan would have to overcome greater distances for this purpose. Therefore, this region cannot meet one of Afghanistan’s key economic needs. From this perspective, the country will still depend on Pakistan (or Iran). In this context, Iran emerges as an option that could make Afghanistan practically independent of Pakistan. Being a neighboring country with seaports, Iran offers Afghanistan the only way to reach open waters, bypassing Pakistan. In the new economic approach, as a complement to Central Asia, Afghanistan particularly highlights Iran to meet its seaport needs. This is achieved by striking agreements with Iran and India, especially utilizing the Iranian port of Chabahar.
An Effective Solution for Afghanistan
Considering its geographical location and numerous economic challenges, Afghanistan should have long ago adopted a policy of economic external management. However, this is only one side of the coin. The other side, complementing the first, is the adoption of an unbiased and balanced foreign policy. Undoubtedly, an economically oriented foreign policy without impartiality and balance will not lead to success. On the other hand, economic orientation cannot be compatible with security orientation.
If, on one hand, Ashraf Ghani proclaimed the slogan of “economically oriented foreign policy” and seemed to be acting in that direction, but at the same time was in a coalition against one party with another, and the presence of the United States in Afghanistan only complicated the situation. Despite the obvious lack of independent foreign policy during the Republic, the Afghan government itself mixed economic polarization with security orientation and a coalition approach to one side against another.
As a result, this distorted and convoluted policy not only did not bring happiness to Afghanistan but also instilled pessimism about relations with the countries of Central Asia. However, in the current absence of U.S. presence in Afghanistan and a government similar to the previous one, it is reasonable for the new authorities of the country to adopt a regional approach, considering the interests of regional countries while adhering to the principles of impartiality and avoiding conflicts with neighbors. This will enable Afghanistan to reap the maximum benefits from an economically oriented foreign policy.