Balochistan – a delayed-action mine

The exchange of missile strikes between Iran and Pakistan over positions of terrorists in Balochistan, a historical region divided between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, has significantly heated up the information field.

Spoiler: “Open World” pays attention to this issue, clearly not affecting the interests of Central Asia, due to our deep conviction that Pakistan and Iran can become the main guarantors of security in Afghanistan.

The Iranians targeted the group “Jaish ul-Adl” (“Army of Justice”), referred to as “Iranian terrorists in Pakistan.” In turn, the IRP army struck “militarized Baloch groups” – the “Balochistan Liberation Army” and the “Baloch Liberation Front,” whose positions are on Iranian territory.

Observers immediately began to speculate that the strikes on “Baloch brands” are a coordinated measure between Islamabad and Tehran. The initial intensity quickly began to decrease, followed by diplomatic pleasantries and assurances that the parties respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, fueling intrigue about “secret agreements.”

The parties indeed have prerequisites for joint action on the “Baloch front.” Not all observers remember that in the 1970s, during another military conflict between Baloch separatists and the Pakistani army, Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi supported the military operation conducted by Islamabad. According to some reports, Iran handed over several dozen attack helicopters and $200 million in aid to Pakistan, and, according to others, Iranian units also participated in operations on IRP territory.

Overall, the current security relations between the countries look fairly positive (manifested in joint naval exercises, cooperation in the fight against drugs, and more) and trace their roots not only to a common understanding of the “Baloch problem” but also to mutual support in the war for Bangladesh’s independence and the Iran-Iraq armed conflict. This can also include “solidarity” in aiding Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

However, considering the objective situation in the complex global relations in the region, we have doubts about the possibility of creating an Iran-Pakistan “anti-Baloch cartel,” at least at the present moment.

The two Islamic republics, despite a trend towards rapprochement, still have complex and contradictory bilateral relations. This is primarily related to geopolitical factors. Pakistan, by the definition of the United States, still falls into the category of “Major non-NATO ally” (the only one in South Asia) with all the implications that come with it. The state of Pakistan-India relations and the IRP’s strategic cooperation with China cast a certain negative shadow on its relations with the United States, but it is still too early to talk about a fundamental revision of the dialogue between Islamabad and Washington.

The Sunni factor and Islamabad’s close relations with Riyadh, as well as the situation of Shiites in Pakistan, also play a significant role.

Additionally, it is worth noting that Pakistan is a member of the military bloc “Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition” (IMCTC), while Iran is not part of it. Although the organization may appear sluggish, participation in it carries certain obligations. It’s worth mentioning that the coalition’s Chief of Staff since 2017 is Pakistani General Raheel Sharif.

Unfortunately, there is no information on the specific targets hit by the Iranian strikes, but it seems crucial for Iran to strike against “Jaish ul-Adl,” especially given their recent terrorist activities. In turn, the Pakistanis followed the principle of “an eye for an eye.”

Iranian intelligence services, evidently, acted based on specific intelligence.

In any case, we hope that the tensions of January will be quickly forgotten, and the incident will push the parties towards pragmatism and the start of a dialogue, including involving Afghanistan.

We would like to believe that agreements can be reached—they could serve as evidence that, despite existing contradictions, Iran and Pakistan are capable of addressing other pressing issues. Primarily, this concerns the security situation in neighboring Afghanistan, particularly the terrorist activities of ISIS-K and other smaller terror groups.

Pakistan and Iran play an exceptional and unique role in the Afghan peace process. These two countries have a defining influence on security in Afghanistan and historically are the most integrated into Afghan issues at the level of political and ethno-cultural conflicts, connected to their neighbor by civilizational and socio-cultural ties. Therefore, their positions and coordinated practical steps will significantly shape the prospects for stability in Afghanistan.

An approach based on integrating Kabul into the Iran-Pakistan security dialogue, as we see it, would be supported by all regional powers and countries interested in an economically prosperous Afghanistan. It is worth noting that Kabul and Tehran are already sending positive signals after the attack in Kerman and periodic terrorist activities in Afghanistan, adding relevance to regional meetings on the security situation in Afghanistan.

For instance, the Taliban has already expressed readiness to hold a meeting with special representatives of the regional countries in Kabul. The Iranian ambassador in Kabul has accepted the proposal. There is information about the establishment of an information exchange center on security between Iran and Afghanistan.