Afghanistan – an indicator of stability in the region

Another publication from the Iranian Institute for East Strategic Studies, in which the factors that led to the rise of the Taliban to power, as well as the conditions for its preservation, are analyzed.

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The notable aspect is the reference by the Iranian expert to the “Pashtun factor” – a determinant of the essence of the Taliban, always having social-historical significance for Afghanistan. Most political experts avoid this question (or approach it superficially), without delving into the historical background, and the “national question” is considered only in the context of the theme of inclusive governance.

It is not irrelevant to remind that the ethnonym “Afghan” historically applied only to Pashtuns, and only in the second half of the 20th century did it begin to be used to denote all residents of the multinational country.

The author concludes that the advent of the Taliban is an objective stage in history, a kind of Pashtun revenge, seeking to reclaim the dominant role in Afghan statehood.

The Iranian expert also introduces the “Pashtun factor” as one of the main reasons for the defeat of ISIS in Afghanistan – the Islamic Empire (caliphate) fundamentally contradicts the “mission” of the Pashtun.

 

Special attention is focused on the role of the regional environment of Afghanistan in the political stabilization of the Taliban regime. As we correctly understand the expert, the countries in the region did not see the Taliban as a “harbinger of instability” and, in this regard, began to build relations with them. Here, there is also an allusion to the geopolitical aspect – in other words, Afghanistan under foreign influence will always pose a threat to the countries in the region.

 

Terms of establishment and preservation of Taliban power in Afghanistan and future development prospects of the situation.

link to the article

 

Introduction

The fall of the republican system in Afghanistan and the subsequent victory of the Taliban Movement are significant events with consequences at the Afghan, regional, and international levels.

The security situation played an undisputed role in the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. Additionally, issues of interaction and other political variables at regional and international levels, which the republican system struggled to handle or remain immune to, were also significant factors. In such a situation, the victory of the Taliban became rapid and inevitable.

After the fall of the republic and the establishment of their dominance, the Movement was not prepared for state governance in terms of lacking necessary political and managerial skills. Militarily, Taliban militants had no experience with national institutions such as the army and law enforcement agencies.

In this sense, the stability of the Taliban seemed precarious and uncertain, with some experts predicting their short-lived stay in power. However, contrary to expectations, the consolidation of the Taliban in Afghanistan progressed rapidly, and to some extent, their position even stabilized.

 

1. Factors of establishing Taliban rule

After more than two years of Taliban rule, many hypotheses and forecasts proved to be unfounded, while the determining role of certain conditions was demonstrated.

Several aspects continue to play a role:

 

• Resolution of intra-group disagreements

At the initial stage of the Taliban’s return, opponents and some analysts predicted serious disagreements among different factions of the regime during the distribution of power and division of political authority.

On the other hand, it was clear that the Taliban were following the path of the leaders of the Afghan mujahideen of the 1970s, adopting the model of internal inter-group disagreements. Despite the differences in the demands of each era and its people, as well as the unique variables of each political development, this factor could have led to the disintegration of the Taliban. While disagreements among various Taliban groups cannot be completely denied, it is also essential not to disregard the fact that studying the experience of inter-group disputes in the 1970s contributed to the stabilization of the Taliban as a political regime from 2021 to the present. From this perspective, a common belief emerged among the group and its supporters, reflected in the public statements of leaders and the opinions of ordinary citizens. It goes something like this: “The mujahideen split and were destroyed in the seventies. We do not differ in opinions to avoid being destroyed”.

In this regard, it can be stated that one of the most fundamental factors in stabilizing the Taliban regime is maintaining unity and preventing intra-factional disagreements.

 

• Achievement of relative security

Research results indicate the weariness of broad segments of the Afghan population and their aversion to war and violence.

Public opinion is centered around previous hopes that the republican system and international support would lead to the establishment of security in Afghanistan, but this did not materialize.

On the contrary, the Taliban government, despite imposing restrictions on public freedoms, managed to ensure public safety in the country. This not only boosted the confidence of the Taliban but also garnered public support, positively impacting the consolidation of their political influence.

 

• Tribal support

In Afghanistan, the correct ethnic policy plays a decisive role. Research and experience clearly show that political power in Afghanistan carries an ethnic character.

Since 1944, coinciding with the rise of nationalist ideas in the region, including Pan-Turkism in Turkey, the previous Afghan rulers attempted to strengthen policies regarding nationalities.

This policy led to significant ethnic disagreements in Afghanistan but created a unique form of unity between the ruling power and the Pashtun people. That’s why the entire period of Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan’s rule is considered a time of absolute political power for the Pashtun people, and the events of the last 50 years, especially the two decades of the republican system, are seen as the decline of Pashtun political power.

The fact that representatives of the younger generation and secular Pashtun intellectuals support the Taliban government is based on nostalgia for the absolute sovereignty of the Pashtuns during the eras of Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan. The Pashtun elite views the Taliban as a means of reviving the absolute and historical power of the Pashtuns.

Mentioning this issue is not just a historical reminder or an expression of a theoretical problem; it is a key factor in the development of events in the last three decades and an effective factor in stabilizing Taliban rule.

For example, in the 1990s, Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government was considered by Pashtun elites as a deviation from history and a transition of political power from Pashtuns to Tajiks. The ignition of civil war between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of “Hezb-e Islami” (Islamic Party of Afghanistan), and “Jamiat-e Islami” (Islamic Society of Afghanistan, B. Rabbani) was also connected to this issue.

For this reason, Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government lacked support among traditional Pashtuns of Afghanistan, who could defend it. Hence, the Taliban Movement emerged from among Pashtun villagers in remote areas of Afghanistan and overthrew Rabbani’s government.

During the rule of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, due to the principle of political participation of various ethnic groups in the republican system, political power was relatively distributed, and the absolute power of the Pashtuns was lost. Consequently, this system was incompatible with the nostalgic sentiment and historical memory of the Pashtuns about the era of Zahir Shah, and for this reason, Pashtun tribes in the south and east of Afghanistan did not support the republican system. Finally, with the fall of the republican system, they established an authoritarian Pashtun government without the participation of other ethnic groups and religions.

A crucial point is that the authoritarian Pashtun government not only has no enemies and opponents in tribal territories under federal jurisdiction (evidently the Tribal Territory of Federal Administration in Pakistan, editor’s note), as was the case in the last three decades, but also has strategic support among them. Emphasizing this point is crucial for understanding current and future events in Afghanistan.

The reason why the ISIS group could not take root in these Pashtun rural areas, as the Taliban Movement did, lies precisely in the Pashtuns’ views on power and their understanding of political authority.

According to Pashtuns, the Taliban government gives them absolute power and strengthens the dominant role of this ethnic group, but the ISIS caliphate can digest and absorb their absolute power into another Islamic empire.

Thus, one of the stabilizing factors of current power in Afghanistan is the Pashtun support for the Taliban government.

 

• Weakness of political and military opponents of the Taliban

At the beginning of the Taliban’s rule, the possibility of forming a strong military resistance front, similar to Ahmad Shah Massoud’s resistance in the Panjshir mountains and northern Afghanistan, was highly probable, which could have questioned the establishment of Taliban rule. However, time revealed that many former mujahideen leaders lost their positions and authority. As the chances of political opponents of the Taliban coming to power and succeeding weakened each day, the possibility of consolidating the authority and rule of the Taliban in the public opinion of Afghanistan increased.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the Khorasan group of the “Islamic State” in Afghanistan was also considered a serious obstacle to the Taliban, but, since ISIS does not belong to the ethnic and indigenous groups of Afghanistan, the Taliban found it easy to halt the growth and spread of this group among tribes. Although both ISIS and pockets of Taliban resistance have not completely disappeared, in the current situation, they are unable to pose a serious threat to the stability of Taliban rule.

 

• Compliance with regional interests

The first arrival of the Taliban led to their military dominance in Afghanistan but did not signify political governance of the country. This was because, apart from Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, no other country recognized the political sovereignty of the Taliban.

However, after the withdrawal of the USA, the countries in the region collectively engaged with the Taliban government, entering into political relations with the administration in Kabul as the de facto government. Even China officially sent its ambassador to Kabul and accepted the Taliban ambassador.

From this perspective, one of the factors that played a very serious role in the establishment of the Taliban was regional interaction. Political power and sovereignty are bilateral matters, and besides the confidence and necessary authority to assert new power, the acceptance and recognition of actions or declarations by other countries are required. For this reason, states of this kind have no chance of achieving sovereignty without the interaction of regional countries, even with full control over the capital of the country.

This regional approach, on the one hand, contributed to the political stability of the Taliban, and on the other hand, opponents of the Taliban, mainly remnants of the former Afghan regime, did not find fertile ground to resist the Taliban.

From this perspective, the Taliban government owes much to the communication policy of regional countries and Afghanistan’s neighbors.

The main reason why regional countries, especially America’s competitors in the region, established interactive relations with the Taliban government is that the Taliban refused to play the role of an agent of instability against the countries of the region. Experience has shown that whenever the territory of Afghanistan becomes a threat to the security of regional countries, either from the ruling state or due to the presence of a foreign state, regional countries contemplate a new alternative for governing Kabul.

Most likely, the Taliban considered this historical rule in their political assessment. In any case, the comprehensive interaction of regional countries and neighbors of Afghanistan with the Taliban played a key role in stabilizing and establishing Taliban rule.

 

2. Conditions for maintaining power

The consolidation of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan does not imply a continuation of Taliban rule. The republican system in Afghanistan was legally established and had the necessary structural foundation. However, the officially established system of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan did not endure. From this perspective, in addition to stabilizing factors, the Taliban government urgently needs conditions that will pave the way for its survival. Three important aspects will help the Taliban maintain power in Afghanistan in the near future:

 

• Policy of true neutrality

The first threat to the stability and continuity of the Taliban government is the struggle between world powers. Historical experience shows that Afghanistan has played the role of a buffer or isolator between competing players at the international level since ancient times.

Countries like Afghanistan usually become sites of conflicts and wars when they either agree to host one of the competing powers on their territory or when one of them forcibly occupies the territory, turning it into a watchtower to observe the activities of neighboring and competing countries. The occupation of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union and later by the United States are two real examples of this judgment.

Although Afghanistan largely no longer plays the role of a buffer in the great games of the colonial period, it is still at risk of becoming a battleground for competing powers. The reason for this threat is that in the post-colonial era and during the arms race, major powers need a “battlefield” for any reason. In this situation, countries and governments with weak governance and internal conflicts, so-called “bankrupt governments”, are usually viewed as a battleground for major rivals.

The facts show that even with the new Taliban government, Afghanistan is still considered a bankrupt country in every sense, and the risk of it becoming a field of competitive struggle still exists. To avoid this scenario, the Taliban government must adopt two strategies.

Firstly, it should adhere to a regime of “relative neutrality” in the major global confrontation, as in the times of Zahir Shah since Afghanistan is not economically capable of pursuing a “policy of complete neutrality”.

Secondly, Afghanistan takes measures towards relative neutrality while very gently integrating into the regional order, adopting economic diplomacy.

Although the choice and implementation of these two strategies are a very complex task, it is a vital and necessary moment for the salvation of Afghanistan and the survival of the Taliban government. If the current authorities can implement this strategy successfully, they will undoubtedly ensure its continuity.

 

• Formation of an inclusive government

The second issue that could potentially threaten the existence of the Taliban political regime is the monopoly of power or the lack of distribution of authoritative powers. In political philosophy theory, the nature of power is such that its concentration and monopoly, even if aimed at its protection, still lead to its downfall.

Moreover, post-jihadist Afghanistan has its factors, according to which the monopoly of power and the absence of its distribution between the government and internal actors lead to these actors not being absorbed into the new political structure and surviving in the shadow of some countries opposing the Taliban, remaining as a lever of pressure and/or alternative force to the Taliban.

These reserve forces can become a serious obstacle to the existence of the Taliban at the right moment, as seen in the current government, which is also a result of such a process. From this perspective, if the Taliban government can, with a realistic assessment, provide a basis for the relative distribution of political power with significant participation from all the various ethnic groups and confessions of Afghanistan, it will undoubtedly eliminate major obstacles and create conditions for its continued rule.

 

• Ensuring Justice and Social Well-being

Unlike developed countries, Afghanistan is a traditional and closed country. Many laws from the past are still preserved. Governments that exercise coercive power usually employ special methods for their legitimacy and survival.

For example, Amanullah Khan, who did not become the heir to his father and was even accused of his murder, prioritized the independence of Afghanistan and engaged public opinion to support his government for legitimacy. Habibullah Khan II (Habibullah Kalakani, a Tajik known as Bacha-ye Saqao, Persian for “son of the water carrier”), in collaboration with the English, toppled Amanullah Khan’s modernist government, and to maintain legitimacy and preserve his government, he labeled Amanullah Khan as “unfaithful”. Assuming the title “servant of the religion of the Messenger of Allah”, he revoked all the laws and civil reforms of Amanullah and even closed schools, opposed girls’ education, read Sharia laws, and prohibited them from studying.

As Habibullah Kalakani was the only person not belonging to the Pashtun ethnic group, the Pashtun elite considered this as the destruction of all of Afghanistan. For this reason, after the forcible takeover of power, Nadir Shah, with the aim of gaining legitimacy and rallying the public opinion of Pashtun tribes in his favor, raised the idea of “Saving Afghanistan” and called himself the “Savior of Afghanistan”. The names of many memorable days and national institutions began to be used with the addition of the word “Najat” (Persian for “salvation”), and historical and royal holidays became “holidays of national salvation” in Afghanistan.

 

These historical moments were mentioned in connection with the fact that traditional models are still relevant and crucial in Afghanistan. It is for this reason that the “National Council” (National Assembly of Afghanistan, a bicameral parliament) as a legal institution failed to achieve the role and position of the traditional “Loya Jirga” (“Grand Council”, an all-Afghan council of elders).

Following historical examples, the Taliban government, taking control of Afghanistan, to ensure its legitimacy and maintain power after the overthrow of the Western system and democracy in Afghanistan, took up “Sharia governance” with the aim of uniting public opinion. The people of Afghanistan are devout and religious, and Afghan society itself is one of the most religious in the region. Therefore, Afghanistan does not face a serious threat of atheism, as in the 1970s during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Marxist thought. Thus, the rigid idea of “Sharia” can mobilize and attract public opinion.

From this perspective, today, two national problems can be identified in Afghanistan – “injustice and poverty”. Therefore, if the Taliban can take on the task of “ensuring social justice” and “fighting poverty” and sincerely seek and implement this throughout society, it will unite public opinion and gain support for its government.

A society suffering from injustice and absolute poverty will undoubtedly support a government that honestly works towards ensuring social justice and fighting poverty.

 

Conclusion

The reality is that the people of Afghanistan are tired and harbor hatred for war and conflicts. To a greater extent, the presence of social and psychological problems among Afghans is related to the establishment of Taliban rule and the absence of political opponents. Another fact is that the people of Afghanistan are so entrenched in poverty and suffering that they think more about “work and food” than democratic ideas and values.

In such a situation, if the Taliban government can provide people with employment and sustenance with relative justice, it will be known as the only government of “justice and prosperity” among all dynasties in the history of Afghanistan. In the medium term, the majority of the population in Afghanistan will support the preservation of this system, and another part will not have significant motivation for resistance. This fact will not allow active presence of anti-Taliban opposition in the country.